Evaluation and wealth effects of merger and acquisition announcements on the US utility industry by Yao, Yao
 
Evaluation and Wealth Effects of Merger and Acquisition Announcements on 
the US Utility Industry 
By Yao Yao 
A research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Master of Finance 
 
Saint Mary’s University 
Copyright Yao Yao 2013 
 
Written for MFIN 6692.0 under the direction of 
Dr. Francis Boabang 
 
                                                                                    Approved:   Dr.Francis Boabang  
                                                                                                          Faculty Advisor 
   
                                                                                    Approved:  Dr. Francis Boabang 
                                                                                                           MFIN Director 





I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Dr. Francis Boabang for his 
encouragement and guidance to complete my thesis. I also would like to express my 
appreciation to all professors from Sobey School of Business master of finance 
program for helping me and giving me this opportunity to studying and solving my 
problems in finance industry.  
 
Moreover, I would like to mention all my friends who help me and gave me lots of 
advice when I was doing my research and analysis.  
 
Finally, I want to thank my family who always supported  me until now. Thank you 
















Yao  Yao 
 
November 20, 2013 
 
The purpose of this paper is evaluate the relationship between mergers and 
acquisitions and the post and pre acquisition performance of some utility firms in the 
United States. Based on the result of the analysis, we evaluate whether it is good or 
bad performance for the market reaction. A sample of 50 M&A cases is randomly 
chosen from Bloomberg for this study. These M&A occurred between January 2010 
and August 2013. 
 
We employ Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and the Market Model to analyze 
the sample to determine whether or not M&A can create value for utility industry in 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In this paper, we attempt to provide answers to the following issue: Will M&A 
destroy or create value for the utility industry in the United States? If yes, how much 
value could be generated for target firms?  
 
1.1Main Idea of Merger and Acquisition (M&A) 
Merger implies the following the combination of two or more commercial companies 
to form a single company. Acquisition is the act of contracting or assuming or 
acquiring possession of something. What are the differences between merger and 
acquisition? Merger refers to an enterprise to take various forms for receiving the 
property rights of other enterprises. However, acquisition refers to an enterprise 
formed through the purchase of shares of listed companies and the companies.  
   
Mergers and acquisitions have several phases. Boland (1970) classified the M&A 
phases into two steps, the pre-merger and post-merger. Farley and Schwallie (1982) 
suggested M&A phases should include the integration of the strategic plan, 
intelligent screening, evaluation of targets through creativity, analysis, understanding 
value and price, anticipating the post-acquisition phase, and efficient implementation. 
Schweiger and Weber (1989) argued that the M&A’s phases include premerger and 
implementation. Salus (1989) believed that the M&A phases include pre-merger, 
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merger and post-merger. Kazemek and Grauman (1989) mentioned that M&A 
process involve assessment, joint planning, issue analysis, structure selection, 
securing approvals, final planning, and implementation. Parenteau and Weston (2003) 
claimed that strategic planning, candidate screening, due diligence, deal execution, 
and the ultimate integration phase related to M&A. 
 
There are three forms of payment associated with M&A’s, namely cash payment, 
securities payment and tangible assets payment for the target firms. Each method has 
its advantages and disadvantages. Paying by cash might cause the companies’ cash 
liquidity to deteriorate. Paying by securities might cause the old shareholders’ 
ownership diluted. And paying by tangible assets could lead the parent companies’ 
leverage increased. Moreover, in a stock transaction process, stock shares increase 
only in the new firm. Due to different motivations, acquiring companies should focus 
on different transactions to choose their targets more wisely in order to maximizing 
the benefit. For example, the acquiring firms will always choose the potential value 
increased firms, which implied that they had chosen the asset transaction. 
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Mergers and acquisitions are often connected with a business or competitive strategy, for 
instance, entering a new product or market segment, or changing the basis of competition. As can 
be seen that M&A motives include as follows: 
(1) M&A motives can develop or enlarge the product line, or complement the products or service 
of the acquiring company, which leads to investment in product differentiation.  
(2) M&A motives can increase market power. The acquiring firms have more power to decide 
the price of products. Also, it can increase barriers of entry into the industry. 
(3) M&A motives can increase market share. In this way, the acquiring firms become more 
competitive. 
 
M&A belongs to corporate strategic terms. The strategy could be a relative one of remaining 
within the same or related industries or branching into other industries. Three strategies can 
describe these as follows: 
 
Firstly, it is the Vertical Merger. Vertical mergers refers to a merger between two companies in 
different industries, producing different products or services. For instance, a firm grows 
vertically in the value chain from extracting raw materials to manufacturing to retailing. Most 
often the logic behind is to improve the merger coordination effect through the integration of 
enterprises.  
 
Secondly, Horizontal Merger, it refers to the merger happens between two companies in the 
same industry. A horizontal merger is a business integration and it is normally a rival offering 
the same goods or services. The horizontal merger indicated acquiring firms to obtain a synergy 
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effect, which is the impact of its co-operation between organizations results when the 
performance of a combined unit is larger than what it would have been without any type of 
collaboration. Which in another words, one plus one is greater than two. 
 
Thirdly, Conglomerate Merger, which refers a merger between enterprises that are included in 
different and unrelated business activities that are completely unrelated. Here there are two 
examples of enterprise group merger: pure enterprise group merger and mix enterprise group 
merger. Pure enterprise group mergers includes companies that have much in common, and 
mixed enterprise group mergers includes the companies that are looking for product extension or 
market expansion. 
 
1.2 US utility industry  
1.2.1 Overview of U.S. Utility industry 
The modern electric utility industry started in the 1880s and expanded rapidly in the 1890s. From 
1901 to 1932, growing economies of scale accelerate growth and consolidation in the electric 
utility industry, as well as the beginnings of State and Federal regulation. Both residential and 
commercial end use of electricity grew precipitate from 1941 to 1945. In 1949, the Federal 
Government authorized Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to create thermal-electric power 
plants for commercial electricity sale. 1950 to 1970 was a time of substantially uninterrupted 
prosperity for the electric utility industry. Demand for electricity grew fast, consistently, and 
predictably, while electricity prices keep on falling.  
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Electric Utilities are public agencies and privately owned companies that generate power for 
public use. The U.S. electric industry contains over 3,100 electric utilities. Investor owned 
electric utilities are privately owned, represent 8 percent of the total, approximately 75 percent of 
utility generating capability, generation, sales, and revenue. Historically, most investor owned 
electric utilities were operating companies that provide basic services for the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity. Publicly owned electric utilities are nonprofit local 
government agencies established to provide service to their communities and nearby consumers 
at cost.  
 
Publicly owned electric utilities involve municipals, public power districts, state authorities, 
irrigation districts, and other state organizations. Municipal electric utilities mostly disperse 
power, although some large ones produce and transmit electricity as well. There are 2,009 
municipal utilities, supplying about 10 percent of the generating capability, and accounting for 
14 to 15 percent of resale revenue. Cooperative electric utilities are owned by their members and 
operate in rural areas with low concentrations of consumers. There are 912 cooperatives, 
operating in 47 States; accounting for 9 percent of total revenue, and around 4 percent of 
generation and generating capability.  
 
Federal electric utilities are non-profitable, and the power they produce is marketed by TVA and 
five DOE agencies. Power Marketers are now considered utilities by FERC, because they buy 
and sell electricity, but do not own or operate generation, transmission, or distribution facilities. 
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Non-utility power producers accounted for 7% of US power generation in 1989. In 1998, they 
accounted for 11%, 14% in 1999, and 20.6% in 2000. These are privately owned entities that 
produce power for their own use and/or for sale to utilities and others.  
 
1.2.2 M&A’s in the Utility Industry 
In the past of a few decades, utility companies attempted to increase the wealth of shareholders 
or bidders by using mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  But how and how deeply does the M&A 
impact of the wealth of shareholders or bidders or some others like rival firms?  
 
M&A’s can reduce cost in the current market of financial, regulatory and market pressures for 
utilities. Framing synergistic goals around financial scale remains the key driver of achieving 
increasing in value and good performance. Given the current marketplace, integrating 
operational synergies in a coherent manner is emerging as a strategic part of capturing and 
sustaining value – whether financial or operational – as well as addressing current market issues. 
 
Any wealth effects for utility mergers are likely to be associated with one or more of three 
specific hypotheses: synergy, hubris and collusion. The synergy hypothesis illustrates that shocks 
from deregulation that cause larger and geographically broader deals which allow utilities to 
better gains economies of scale and scope. Based on contract, the hubris hypothesis argues that 
the freedom afforded by deregulation capacitates overconfident managers to more easily build 
empires via mergers. Finally, the collusion hypothesis assumes that the large firms and higher 
concentration tied to merger activity will lead a less competitive industry. Each of this 
 
7 | P a g e  
 
hypothesis has different senses for the wealth effect to bidders, target and rival firms. 
1.3 Energy Industry in the U.S. 
U.S.A is an enriched resources and energy country. Because of this, utility industry plays a 
significant role in the U.S.’s economy. This kind of industry mainly includes petroleum products 
and crude oil, electricity and natural gas.   
 
In the year of 2013, the energy industry was approximately 7.8 percent of the U.S.’s GDP, which 
is the same as year 2012. The main points of statistics of the utility energy are as presented in 
Table 1.3.1 below. It illustrated that the utility industry in the U.S.is growing at an rising rate. 
For instance, from the perspective of annual utility energy export revenues we can see, the main 
difference between the year 2013 and 2012 is around positive $13 billion. Moreover, utility 
companies in the U.S. could be separated into five categories, which are oil, natural gas coal, 
uranium mining and power.       
Energy Statistics for the U.S.A, 2012-2013 (Table 1.3.1) 
 2012 2013 Difference 2012-2013 
The energy industry's 
direct contribution to 







Annual energy export 







The energy industry's 
direct contribution to 
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cent) 








Sources: Statistics U.S.A, Energy Information Administration 
 
This paper tried to focus on the U.S.’s utility industry for two reasons.  Firstly, the utility 
industry is globally in engages and nature in M&A activity extensively.  Therefore, many 
scholars focus on the utility industry have a advantage which is worldwide applicability.  
Secondly, utility industry is quite different from the others. The reason is that its products 
associated with nature energy resources. There is a native incentive for companies in use of 
M&A activity to expand its business and make more benefits. Now we know that abnormal 
short-term returns could be expected offer a higher returns needed to offset higher risks.  Quite 
similar, focus on strengthen post-M&A efficiency and its accounting impact could possibly 
reflect the synergies declared in the interpretations by companies which engaging in M&A 
transactions.   
 
1.4 Organization of the study 
In Chapter 2, the main concept of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) will be given. In 
addition, some previous research on mergers and acquisitions will be included. In Chapter 3, the 
paper will explain and analyze the market reaction to merger and acquisitions in the US utility 
industry and to test the market efficiency based on the data from 2010 to 2013. The objective is 
to determine whether there exists abnormal returns before or after a M&A announcement date. 
According to Copeland and Weston (1988), there are three types of models to test event studies, 
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including: the Market Model, the Average Abnormal Return Model and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. This paper will provide test and analyze results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 and give the 
conclusion, limitations and recommendations of the evaluation and wealth effect impact to the 

























Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
To review literature on mergers and acquisition, we should focus on the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
  
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The main idea of efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been defined by Fama during the year 
of 1960’s. In a Recent article, Fama (1976) agreed that a security’s price is fairly priced in the 
stock market, the reason why this happened is because the information is fully reflectedin the 
price. Moreover, people can use the information that is widely available to everyone in the stock 
market. Stock prices fluctuate in a random walk pattern, and nobody can predict tomorrow’s 
stock prices based on historical stock prices, under the efficient market hypothesis. There are 
three forms supported or in another word associated with EMH which maintained Strong form, 
semi-strong form and weak form. 
 
Strong form made some statements about that all the information maintained inside information 
which has already been reflected in the stock prices. This refers that nobody can earn an extra 
return regardless for both insiders and outsiders under the strong form EMH. Let’s take this 
assumptions: if the insider can gain an abnormal return, we can easily made an conclusion that 
the strong form market efficiency does not exist at all. For example, Khan and Ikram (2011) did 
the analysis on the Indian Capital Market to test whether the strong form market efficiency exist 
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or not by texting the performance of mutual funds. The results concluded that the mutual funds 
had been outperformed the market. All in all, we can say that the strong form market efficiency 
does not exist in the Indian capital market. 
 
Semi-strong form indicated that all the public information are widely and available for everyone, 
and all the public information has already been reflected in the stock prices. Fundamental 
analysis seems not very useful under semi-strong form EMH. The event study method could be 
used to texting the macro and micro events. Macro events indicated that economic policies and 
condition. For instance, monetary policy, fiscal policy, financial crisis and something like that. 
Micro events shows that firms’ specific events which consisting of dividend announcements, 
new products announcements, stock splits, and news of change in CEO, etc. Tobias (2011) had 
been tested the semi-strong form of efficiency at the Nairobi Stock Exchange using the way of 
dividend announcement and firm value. Hussin et al (2011) had been listed approximately 120 
companies to investigate the announcement influence for both dividend and earnings on stock 
prices to determine the semi-strong form in the Malaysian Stock Exchange. Their test illustrated 
that after dividend and earnings rising announcements there is a positive abnormal return. But 
after dividend and earnings declining announcements there is a negative abnormal return. 
 
After analysis, Ball and Brown (1968) made an announcement that after a firm’s earning 
announcement, there is not a significant affect on the security prices. Majority of the annual 
earning’s information had been combined into security price movement and they was taken 
account by the market. Because of this, it offered empirical evidence for semi-strong form 
efficiency.  
 
12 | P a g e  
 
 
During the period of 1972, Scholes had been tested the effect of secondary offerings on the stock 
price. The stock prices declined resulting from some non-public information but was just known 
by the minority number of sellers. Beaver (1968) tested and analysis a sample of around 143 
firms from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which including Security Returns Variability 
(SRV) and Trading Volume Activity (TVA), In order to test market reaction to annual earnings 
announcements. The results illustrated that after the earnings announcement around 33 
percentage increased in TVA and the rest of 61 percent was increased in SRV. 
 
Weak form illustrate that all the market data which maintained trading prices and trading 
volumes, and they have already been reflected in the stock prices. Under weak form EMH, 
technical analysis will have no useful. Many previous study on weak form test illustrate that the 
stock prices moves not randomly and the abnormal return could be earned. For instance Asma 
(2000) deliberated the Dhaka stock market and he found that some of the share return series do 
goes randomly and the weak-form of EMH has been rejected. Francesco et al (2010) investigated   
the EMH for Eastern and Central Europe equity markets during the period of 1999 to 2009. 
Many evidence told people that a lot of markets are not weak form efficient. Kashif et al (2010) 
developed a research on Asia-Pacific markets, and he’s conclusion is that investors possibly can 
earn benefit and abnormal returns from arbitrage among many different capital markets. 
 
2.2 Event studies on M&A 
Recently, financial literature appear to say that majority of empirical analysis of M&A is based 
on event studies. As far as we know, those previous study could be separated into four categories 
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based on the results. First of all, based on part of previous study, someone get the result that 
significant positive abnormal returns could more likely be earned after M&A’s announcement. 
Secondly, the result of significant negative abnormal return do exist in some papers. Thirdly, 
some people focus on the relationship between firm size and M&A. This could reflect the result 
that the smaller size of the firm, the more benefit it makes after M&A. At last I have to say that 
there is a little bit of confusion for the study of this area because it’s no very clear conclusion in 
some of the articles. 
 
If we can focus on the evidence of the study which indicates that acquiring firms attain 
significant positive returns from M&A. For instance, Jensen and Ruback (1983) reported that  
acquiring firms could earn about 30 percent target return in tender offers and around 20 percent 
target return in mergers. More like this, Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) found that there is a big 
ascend in productivity efficiency after takeovers as long as they made the analysis of the 
relationship between M&A and productivity, picking up the North America (i.e. Canadian) 
manufacturing sector from the year 1971 to 1979.  
 
Moreover, Healy et al (1992) texted 50 of the largest U.S. M&A from the year 1979 to the year 
mid-1984 and reported that compared with the industrial average level, the acquiring firms looks 
significantly improving their asset productivity. Therefore, after M&A, they accessed with 
higher operating cash flow (OCF) returns. 
 
Whereas, some study performance that there is a negative return occurred for the acquiring firm 
after firms’ M&A. For instance, Andre et al (2004) picked up a sample which include 267 
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Canadian mergers and acquisitions events from the year 1980 to 2000, and then he used different 
calendar-time approaches which including and excluding overlapping cases. The results 
illustrated that Canadian acquirers have been obtained significant negative returns over the 3 
years after firms’ M&A. Loughran and Vijh (1997) made an study of 947 acquisitions during the 
period of 1970 to 1989. They recommended that the sample firms with stock transaction could 
earn significantly negative excess returns of approximately negative 25.0 percent. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1989) analysis the manufacturing sector in the U.S. during the period time from 
1957 to 1977 and concluded that the profitability of sample firms declined rapidly after M&A. 
 
What’s more, there is also some evidence for some study to show that the returns to acquiring 
firms is depend on firm size. Sara et al (2003) studied around 12023 acquisitions by public firms 
during the period time of 1980 to 2001. They said that the announcement return for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders is approximately 2 percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective 
of the form of financing and it does not concerned  whether the sample firm is public or not. The 
result is not very outstanding to show if M&A performance good or not in the long-term 
acquiring firms, and the existing evidence is confused us. Franks et al (1991) said that there is no 
evidence to show significant abnormal returns exceed a 3 years period after M&A. Agrawal et al 
(1992) showed that acquisitions are always associated with insignificant abnormal returns. 
However, significant abnormal returns of around negative 10 percent over a 5 years period of 
time after mergers. 
 
From previous study illustrated that from the empirical side, the concept of M&A was mainly 
explained from the difference between stock transaction and cash transaction and the relationship 
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between specific events and M&A. However, this paper is going to study and analysis the market 
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Chapter 3 
                                                  Data Resources and Methodology 
In this chapter, different models will be used to texting the collected data, and to see whether the 
data is significant or not. The steps followed the steps below: 
 
Data Description 
For each company, there are sixteen columns datasets in the sample, including company list, 
event date and historical stock price list (which include open price, high price, low price, close 
price adjust close price for daily and returns), and same thing for daily index list which is in the 
other part, right side of the form. There are also some other factors like alpha, beta, standard 
error term and R would be provided. (An example will be given in Appendix 2) On the company 
list, it covers M&A of 50 U.S. utility companies during the period time from January 2010 to 
August 2013. Moreover, the M&A took place in May, June, July, and August. The daily stock 
price of these U.S. firms are also included in the daily stock price list and it includes daily stock 
price from 2010 to 2013. However, it excludes firms with M&A more than once, which means 
that if another M&A happened within the estimate event window of the first M&A, this would 
be identified as an over-lapping event. 
 
This paper has showed the study based on a different database, which do not include the over-
lapping events. Due to the passed time period (second and third time period) might be effect the 
first time period M&A, if it is not ignored, the conclusion is high likely to be biased. It also study 
the daily volume of the companies during the period time of 2010 to 2013 to text the change in 
trading volume is ex or post of the M&A.  
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3.1 Market Model 
Market Model could be used to text semi-strong form of EMH. First of all, we need to figure out 
the return on the stocks. The formula (Equation 3.1) has been given as follow: 
Rt = Pt/(Pt-1)-1                                             (Equation 3.1) 
where: 
Rt= return on stock during period t 
Pt= stock price during period t 
Pt-1= stock price during period t-1 
Secondly, the next formula which has been given in (Equation 3.2) illustrated the Market Model. 
                                       (Equation 3.2) 
where: 
Ri,t= return on security i during period t 
αi= intercept of the equation for security i 
βi= slope of the equation for security i 
Rm,t= return on the market during period t 
εi,t= error term 
STATA program is the on could be used to do the regression of Equation 3.2. I choose NYSE 
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In order to do the simple linear regression, there are four assumptions below:  
The expected value of the random error e: E(e)=0 
The variance of the random error e: var(e)=σ
2
 
The covariance between any pair of random errors ei and ej: cov(ei, ej)=0 
The values of e are normally distributed about their mean: e～N(0, σ2) 
(See Hill et al 2012) 
 
3.2 Three sectors: Average Abnormal Returns (AAR), Average Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (ACAR) and Abnormal Returns (AR)  
Equation 3.3 represents the Abnormal Return (AR). 
                                    (Equation 3.3) 
where,  
ARi,t=the abnormal return on security i during period t.  
Ri,=return on security i during period t.  
Rm,t =NYSE index. 




ARit                                          (Equation 3.4) 
where, N is the number of securities. 
T-test would be used. Null hypothesis is stated: 
)ˆˆ( ,,, tmiititi RRAR  
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H0:AARt =0 (if it is true, market is efficient)  
Alternative hypothesis is stated:  
Ha:AARt≠0 (if it is true, market is not efficient) 
If do not reject null hypothesis, we will get the conclusion that market is efficient. If reject null 
hypothesis,  then the market is not efficient.  
 
3.3 Research Steps 
In this part, four main factors will be given, which maintained Trading volume, Stock price, Data 
selection and Data sources. 
 
3.3.1 Trading Volume 
I use event studies to test market reaction of M&A’s. Firstly, an event window of 20 days had 
been chose, which refers to 10 days before t=0 (M&A) and 10 days after that time. E0 represents 
the return on the event window. Secondly, I choose 30 days ex event window and 30 days post 
event window. E- and E+ represents return on ex event window and return on post event window 
respectively.  
 
In this situation, STATA has been used to test E0, E- and E+. At first, compared E0 with E- to 
find out if the M&A announcement has an impact on trading volume or not. If E0 is greater than 
E-, which means it is positive and significant, and we can get the result that M&A announcement 
effect changes in trading volume and vice versa for sure. On the other hand, compared E- with 
E+ in order to test if post-M&A can create value for U.S utility firms or not. If E+ is greater than 
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E- which refers it is significantly positive, and get the result that the value of U.S utility firms is 
growing up after M&A transaction and vice versa. 
Figure 3.3.1        Event Window 
Ex event window        event window        post event window 
I---------------------------I----------------I----------------I----------------------------I 
t=-40   （E -= 30） t=-10                t=0                 t=+10      （ E +=30）  t=+40 
                                                            E0 
 
3.3.2 Stock price 
The method to test stock price is the same as before text trading volume. STATA could be used 
to test W0, W- and W+. First of all, compared W0 with W- to find out whether M&A 
announcement has effect on stock price. If W0 is greater than W- which means it is positive and 
significant, and can get the result that stock prices are effected by M&A announcements. If the 
conclusion is the reverse, which means M&A announcements will not impact stock prices. 
Moreover, compared W- with W+, in order to test if post-M&A can create value for U.S utility 
firms or not. If W+ is greater than W- which means it is significantly positive, then, can get the 
result that the value of U.S utility 1 firms is growing up after M&A transaction and vice versa. 
 
Figure 3.3.2 
    Ex event window        event window        post event window 
I---------------------------I----------------I----------------I----------------------------I 
t-=40  （W-=30）    t-=10              t=0               t+=10    （ W +=30）   t+=40 
                                                           W0 
 
21 | P a g e  
 
 
3.4 Data Selection 
In this paper 50 Utility companies have been chose which traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and merger and acquisitions that took place during the period time of January 
2010 to August 2013. And there are some rules which the company list in the sample should 
qualified by the following criteria: 
1) It must be a common stock and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
2) Data for these companies must undertake an IPO for at least 1 year before M&A 
announcement and continue at least 1 year after M&A. 
3) The companies should not include overlapping cases in the whole event window. 
 
3.5 Data sources 
The data of daily closing prices and M&A announcement from the year 2010 to 2013 for were 
collected from Bloomberg. 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of Results 
In this chapter, the method and main steps to run STATA program will be provided. What’s 
more the analysis based on each of the result will be offered as well. In each time, whether to 
reject or do not reject the null hypothesis to illustrate how significant the results are. Every detail 
will be showed below. 
 
4.1 Overview 
This section is going to analyze and explain the results of the models, which derive from Chapter 
3.2.1 and 3.2.2, M&A from 2010 to 2013 (the list of firms is attached in Appendix). Those data 
has been collected and run them in STATA to get these results. Put the Excel form in to the 
STATA to run the regression, and the orders are: 
1.    set obs, ‘obs’ 
2.    tempvar r x y 
3.    gen’r’= invnorm ( uniform()) 
4.    gen ‘x’= invnorm (uniform ()) 
5.    gen’y’ = ‘a’+’b’*’x’+’r’ 
6.    sum 
7.    regress’y’  ‘x’ 
8.    return scalar alpha = b (_cons) 
9.    return scalar beta = _b (‘x’) 
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4.2 Stock Price 
4.2.1 Regression Analysis 
Market Model (Equation 3.2) describe the linear relationship between expected return and beta. 
In this sample, I used the NYSE index as the market return. 




Table 4.1illustrate the regression results of the Market Model. If look at the output, it shows that 
α (cons), the intercept of market model which regard as -0.000292. And β (idx return), the slope 
of market model which regard as 0.7330951. In order to measures the sensitivity of the security 
to the market return we should focus on the value of β. The result is the greater the value of β, 
the more sensitive the security to the market return. This conclusion illustrate that the change in 
these securities is sensitive to the change of market return. 
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The other important term R-squared is a broad application in linear regression. It measures if the 
original data points match the linear regression or not. In another words, the R-squared value is 
to measure how well does the final line fits the original data points. A higher R-squared value 
represents stocks price match the market model better, which refers that the securities is tracking 
the performance of the market index. In the paper, it equals to the US utility stocks price 
following the pattern of the NYSE index. But, from the graph above, the results show R-squared 
is about 0.0791 and adjusted R-squared is around 0.0777. The value is relatively too low. The 
movement of stocks price in this sample does not tracking the demonstration of the NYSE index. 
 
4.2.2 Average Abnormal Return (AAR) Results 
There are totally three main purposes to test average abnormal returns. Firstly, is to test whether 
the market is efficient or not. Secondly, is to test whether M&A’s can affect stock price or not. 
Last but not the least, is to test whether the value of US utility firms can grow up or not after 
M&A. Table 4.2 is to show the output of average abnormal return. This paper offered the use of 
the daily stock price list and the event window maintained at 10 days, which refers 5 days before 
M&A and 5 days after. 
Table 4.2 
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For this time, the T-test could be used. Null hypothesis is: H0: AARt =0. The alternative 
hypothesis is: Ha: AARt≠0. Through the text, if P-value is more than 0.05 which means P>0.05, 
do not reject the null hypothesis. If P-value is less than 0.05 which refers P<0.05, do reject the 
null hypothesis. For the output, AR represents average abnormal return (AAR). The value of P- 
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The aar2_1 appears in both Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 which represents the difference between 
return (R-1) in ex-event window and return (R0) in event window. The value of P- is 0.2369, 
which is greater than 0.05.Thus, we do not reject null hypothesis and get the result that M&A do 
not have any effect on stock prices.  
Table 4.5 
 
Table 4.5 identical the difference output between the return in the ex-event window (R-1) and 
return in the post-event window (R+1). The aar3_1 illustrate the difference between R-1 and R+1 . 
If look at the output, the result represents that the difference between two is 0.0003155. But, 
value of P- is 0.1182. Do not reject the null hypothesis, the null hypothesis H0 :=0. The result 
shows that M&A’s do not generate any value for U.S. utility firms. 
 
4.3 Volume 
Another data resource is the daily volume of M&A firms in U.S. utility industry. The goal of the 
test is to figure out if there is a change in volume before or after M&A. The result has been 
showed in Table 4.6. 
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  Table 4.6 
 
Avg1 (V-1) and Avg2 (V0) in the output illustrates the average volume in ex event window and 
event window. They are around 3245529 and 4614869, respectively, and the difference between 
those two is 1369341. It apparently represents that the average volume (V0) in the event window 
is much more than the average volume (V-1) in ex event window. Moreover, the value of T- and 
P- are approximately 20.0759 and 0.0000. Therefore, do reject the null hypothesis. Null 
hypothesis regard as H0 :(diff)=0.  The result shows that the difference between V0 and V-1 is 










The aim of this paper is focus on and trying to solve two questions. Firstly, do M&A’s have 
impact on stock prices? Secondly, do M&A create value for US utility firms? If yes, is it large or 
small? The daily stock price and volume of US utility firms during the period of 2010 to 2013 
have been used to progress the empirical analysis research. 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
This paper acquired the results from running STATA program, and can get 5 results from above. 
Firstly, use the Bloomberg to run STATA to do the regression analysis of the Market Model. 
Based on the output, the target security which refers the sample has been chosen do not track the 
expression of the NYSE index. Secondly, According to the results of the average accumulative 
return (AAR), the result shows that the market is efficiency. The reason is do not reject the null 
hypothesis. Null hypothesis H0: AARt =0. Thirdly, from above, there is totally no abnormal 
return during the 10 days event window. Therefore, M&A do not effecting stock prices at all. 
Fourthly, there is no changes exist between the return in the ex-event window and the post-event 
window. Thus, it is easy to get this result: M&A couldn’t generate value for U.S. utility firms. 




29 | P a g e  
 
5.2 Limitations and Recommendations 
The result illustrate that M&A do not have any effect on stock prices and M&A can’t generate 
firm’s value either. The reasons to explain this result are: First of all, a lot of factors might 
impact stock prices, not only because of M&A. Moreover, M&A is not the most important factor 
to effect and determine the stock prices. Therefore, it is reasonable that there is no impact. 
Secondly, 50 companies’ M&A events of U.S. utility industry have been used as the sample to 
analysis. The specialties of the utility industry are stable, and the volatility is relatively low.  
 
The case also has a disadvantage, which is just 50 events of the U.S. utility stocks have been 
chosen on the NYSE, perhaps the sample is relatively small. That’s why there is no statistically 
significant results. But the sample is qualified to meet the requirement to do the test, and the 
result could be accepted. However if the result needs to be more accurate and favorable, 
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R sq = 0.160468
ACCEL ACCEL Cnx IT Cnx IT Total ARAverage
days Firm_id date Stock PriceReturn Index ReturnExpected returnsAR CAR t-test total 50 firmsAR post_ev ex_ev
2011/6/22 42.3 6240.2 aar2 aar1
-33 A1001 2011/6/23 42 -0.00709 6298.35 0.009319 0.009473 -0.01657 -0.01657 -0.64768 -0.07872 -0.00213 -0.0034 -0.00213
-32 A1001 2011/6/24 42.7 0.016667 6499.1 0.031873 0.03038 -0.01371 -0.03028 -0.53616 -0.20028 -0.00541 -0.01328 -0.00541
-31 A1001 2011/6/27 42 -0.01639 6530.8 0.004878 0.005357 -0.02175 -0.05203 -0.8504 0.181052 0.004893 0.004423 0.004893
-30 A1001 2011/6/28 41.75 -0.00595 6525.35 -0.00083 6.22E-05 -0.00601 -0.05804 -0.23516 0.172859 0.004672 0.002923 0.004672
-29 A1001 2011/6/29 41.75 0 6570.6 0.006934 0.007263 -0.00726 -0.06531 -0.28399 0.109763 0.002967 -0.0023 0.002967
-28 A1001 2011/6/30 42.1 0.008383 6624.7 0.008234 0.008468 -8.4E-05 -0.06539 -0.0033 0.215362 0.005821 0.001244 0.005821
-27 A1001 2011/7/1 42 -0.00238 6674.75 0.007555 0.007839 -0.01021 -0.07561 -0.39935 -0.16819 -0.00455 0.000991 -0.00455
-26 A1001 2011/7/4 41.75 -0.00595 6685.85 0.001663 0.002377 -0.00833 -0.08393 -0.32567 -0.26068 -0.00705 0.001195 -0.00705
-25 A1001 2011/7/5 41.65 -0.0024 6708.4 0.003373 0.003962 -0.00636 -0.09029 -0.24856 0.209699 0.005668 -0.00631 0.005668
-24 A1001 2011/7/6 41.65 0 6704.1 -0.00064 0.000242 -0.00024 -0.09053 -0.00944 0.220321 0.005955 0.003364 0.005955
-23 A1001 2011/7/7 42.35 0.016807 6787.35 0.012418 0.012346 0.004461 -0.08607 0.174408 -0.02345 -0.00063 -0.00406 -0.00063
-22 A1001 2011/7/8 41.35 -0.02361 6723.85 -0.00936 -0.00784 -0.01578 -0.10185 -0.61684 -0.37303 -0.01008 -0.00628 -0.01008
-21 A1001 2011/7/11 41.5 0.003628 6612.05 -0.01663 -0.01458 0.018204 -0.08365 0.711753 -0.01545 -0.00042 -0.00172 -0.00042
-20 A1001 2011/7/12 40.75 -0.01807 6415.45 -0.02973 -0.02672 0.008653 -0.07499 0.338307 -0.00543 -0.00015 0.005639 -0.00015
-19 A1001 2011/7/13 41.25 0.01227 6408.55 -0.00108 -0.00016 0.012431 -0.06256 0.48604 -0.1557 -0.00421 -0.00358 -0.00421
-18 A1001 2011/7/14 41.15 -0.00242 6325.9 -0.0129 -0.01112 0.008694 -0.05387 0.339938 -0.03821 -0.00103 -0.00844 -0.00103
-17 A1001 2011/7/15 41.65 0.012151 6346.05 0.003185 0.003788 0.008362 -0.0455 0.326959 0.081497 0.002203 0.002005 0.002203
-16 A1001 2011/7/18 41.5 -0.0036 6296.75 -0.00777 -0.00637 0.002764 -0.04274 0.108059 0.016485 0.000446 -0.00091 0.000446
-15 A1001 2011/7/19 45.85 0.104819 6365.95 0.01099 0.011022 0.093797 0.051056 3.667312 0.165276 0.004467 -0.00597 0.004467
-14 A1001 2011/7/20 43.75 -0.0458 6327.7 -0.00601 -0.00473 -0.04107 0.009989 -1.60569 0.126497 0.003419 -0.00443 0.003419
-13 A1001 2011/7/21 43.8 0.001143 6335.9 0.001296 0.002037 -0.00089 0.009095 -0.03495 -0.02337 -0.00063 0.004424 -0.00063
-12 A1001 2011/7/22 43.7 -0.00228 6438.5 0.016193 0.015846 -0.01813 -0.00903 -0.70881 -0.24277 -0.00656 0.007138 -0.00656
-11 A1001 2011/7/25 44.6 0.020595 6434.45 -0.00063 0.000253 0.020342 0.011308 0.795353 0.103734 0.002804 0.005878 0.002804
-10 A1001 2011/7/26 45.45 0.019058 6426.85 -0.00118 -0.00026 0.019317 0.030626 0.755281 -0.07381 -0.00199 -0.00158 -0.00199
-9 A1001 2011/7/27 46.85 0.030803 6408.45 -0.00286 -0.00182 0.032621 0.063247 1.275436 -0.02357 -0.00064 0.000635 -0.00064
-8 A1001 2011/7/28 45.05 -0.03842 6307.4 -0.01577 -0.01378 -0.02464 0.038606 -0.9634 0.091068 0.002461 0.003211 0.002461
-7 A1001 2011/7/29 44.05 -0.0222 6335.1 0.004392 0.004906 -0.0271 0.011502 -1.05972 -0.13479 -0.00364 0.004555 -0.00364
-6 A1001 2011/8/1 44 -0.00114 6382.1 0.007419 0.007712 -0.00885 0.002655 -0.34593 -0.06141 -0.00166 -0.00262 -0.00166
-5 A1001 2011/8/2 41.9 -0.04773 6274.95 -0.01679 -0.01473 -0.033 -0.03035 -1.29028 0.092591 0.002502 0.001226 0.002502
-4 A1001 2011/8/3 42.85 0.022673 6217.35 -0.00918 -0.00767 0.030346 0 1.186476 0.092651 0.002504 -0.00458 0.002504
-3 A1001 2011/8/4 42.45 -0.0093 6157.2 -0.00967 -0.00813 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.04704 -0.02565 -0.00069
-2 A1001 2011/8/5 40.95 -0.03534 5911.55 -0.0399 -0.03615 0.000809 -0.00039 0.031646 0.002781 0.000075
-1 A1001 2011/8/8 42.45 0.03663 5651.75 -0.04395 -0.0399 0.076531 0.076137 2.992222 0.332347 0.008982
0 A1001 2011/8/9 41.1 -0.0318 5452.4 -0.03527 -0.03186 5.7E-05 0.076194 0.00222 -0.02625 -0.00071
1 A1001 2011/8/10 43.2 0.051095 5588.7 0.024998 0.024007 0.027088 0.103282 1.059094 0.184424 0.004984
2 A1001 2011/8/11 42.75 -0.01042 5555.6 -0.00592 -0.00465 -0.00576 0.097519 -0.22531 -0.18515 -0.005
3 A1001 2011/8/12 43.3 0.01287 5416.25 -0.02508 -0.02241 0.03528 0.132799 1.379375 -0.08951 -0.00242
4 A1001 2011/8/16 42.45 -0.01963 5469.65 0.009859 0.009974 -0.0296 0.103194 -1.1575 -0.12565 -0.0034
5 A1001 2011/8/17 40.95 -0.03534 5571.2 0.018566 0.018045 -0.05338 0.049813 -2.0871 -0.49136 -0.01328
6 A1001 2011/8/18 39.55 -0.03419 5348.35 -0.04 -0.03624 0.002053 0.051866 0.080285 0.16364 0.004423
7 A1001 2011/8/19 38.55 -0.02528 5113.85 -0.04385 -0.03981 0.014521 0.066387 0.567746 0.108169 0.002923
8 A1001 2011/8/22 38.05 -0.01297 5087.65 -0.00512 -0.00391 -0.00906 0.05733 -0.35411 -0.0852 -0.0023
9 A1001 2011/8/23 40.5 0.064389 5289.1 0.039596 0.037538 0.026851 0.084182 1.049834 0.046017 0.001244
10 A1001 2011/8/24 40.2 -0.00741 5222.1 -0.01267 -0.01091 0.003499 0.08768 0.136795 0.036673 0.000991
11 A1001 2011/8/25 39.65 -0.01368 5096.7 -0.02401 -0.02142 0.007741 0.095421 0.302667 0.044202 0.001195
12 A1001 2011/8/26 37.15 -0.06305 5088.7 -0.00157 -0.00062 -0.06243 0.032989 -2.44101 -0.23331 -0.00631
13 A1001 2011/8/29 37.4 0.006729 5339.1 0.049207 0.046447 -0.03972 -0.00673 -1.55288 0.124463 0.003364
14 A1001 2011/8/30 38 0.016043 5451.25 0.021005 0.020306 -0.00426 -0.01099 -0.16669 -0.15016 -0.00406
15 A1001 2011/9/2 38 0 5384.15 -0.01231 -0.01057 0.010574 -0.00042 0.413422 -0.23228 -0.00628
16 A1001 2011/9/5 37.35 -0.01711 5299.65 -0.01569 -0.01371 -0.00339 -0.00381 -0.13269 -0.06351 -0.00172
17 A1001 2011/9/6 37.5 0.004016 5366.2 0.012557 0.012475 -0.00846 -0.01227 -0.33075 0.208641 0.005639
18 A1001 2011/9/7 38 0.013333 5374.95 0.001631 0.002347 0.010986 -0.00128 0.429544 -0.13263 -0.00358
19 A1001 2011/9/8 38 0 5456.1 0.015098 0.01483 -0.01483 -0.01611 -0.57984 -0.3121 -0.00844
20 A1001 2011/9/9 39.2 0.031579 5339.2 -0.02143 -0.01902 0.050603 0.034488 1.978499 0.074195 0.002005
21 A1001 2011/9/12 39.25 0.001276 5157.85 -0.03397 -0.03065 0.031923 0.066412 1.248154 -0.03359 -0.00091
22 A1001 2011/9/13 39.6 0.008917 5204.75 0.009093 0.009264 -0.00035 0.066065 -0.01356 -0.22107 -0.00597
23 A1001 2011/9/14 39.6 0 5425.1 0.042336 0.040078 -0.04008 0.025987 -1.56699 -0.1639 -0.00443
24 A1001 2011/9/15 40.35 0.018939 5550.15 0.02305 0.022201 -0.00326 0.022725 -0.12754 0.163674 0.004424
25 A1001 2011/9/16 40 -0.00867 5494.05 -0.01011 -0.00853 -0.00014 0.022584 -0.0055 0.264104 0.007138
26 A1001 2011/9/19 40 0 5443.4 -0.00922 -0.00771 0.00771 0.030294 0.301435 0.217479 0.005878
27 A1001 2011/9/20 39.9 -0.0025 5613.35 0.031221 0.029775 -0.03228 -0.00198 -1.26191 -0.05839 -0.00158
28 A1001 2011/9/21 39.1 -0.02005 5606.95 -0.00114 -0.00022 -0.01983 -0.02181 -0.77528 0.023501 0.000635
29 A1001 2011/9/22 37.95 -0.02941 5385.3 -0.03953 -0.03581 0.006395 -0.01542 0.250031 0.118796 0.003211
30 A1001 2011/9/23 38.75 0.02108 5367.75 -0.00326 -0.00219 0.023265 0.00785 0.90964 0.168541 0.004555
31 A1001 2011/9/26 37.4 -0.03484 5387.65 0.003707 0.004272 -0.03911 -0.03126 -1.52917 -0.0968 -0.00262
32 A1001 2011/9/27 37.75 0.009358 5579.7 0.035646 0.033877 -0.02452 -0.05578 -0.95864 0.045353 0.001226
33 A1001 2011/9/28 37.9 0.003974 5623.9 0.007922 0.008178 -0.0042 -0.05998 -0.1644 -0.16946 -0.00458
6240.2
